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NFL NETWORK BLACKOUTS:
OLD LAW MEETS NEW TECHNOLOGY
WITH THE ADVENT OF THE
SATELLITE DISH
ALAN FECrEAU*
INTRODUCrlON
The National Football League (NFL)' has been around a long time.
Since its inception in 1920,2 the NFL has emerged from a poorly-fi-
nanced, loosely-organized association of struggling clubs into a mega-
industry.3
* J.D. University of Nebraska-Lincoln College of Law. Advanced Degree in Sports Man-
agement, University of Georgia.
1. The NFL is an unincorporated, non-profit association of member clubs which own and
operate professional football teams. Tim NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONSTITUTION AND
BY-LAWS, art. 2, § 2.2 (1976) [hereinafter NFL CoNsTrrUTIoN].
2. The founding franchise owners of the NFL, then known as the American Professional
Football Association (APFA), met at the Hupmobile automobile dealership in Akron, Ohio,
during the summer of 1920. The 11 owners each tendered $100, and elected legendary football
player and Olympian, Jim Thorpe, the league's first president. APFA teams included the
Akron Steels, Buffalo (N.Y.) All-Americans, Chicago Cardinals, Chicago Tigers, Canton
(Ohio) Bulldogs, Cleveland Panthers, Decatur (Ill.) Staleys, Detroit Heralds, Hammond
(Ind.) Pros, Rochester (N.Y.) Jeffersons, and Rock Island (Ill.) Independents. Ex-major
league baseball player George "Papa Bear" Halas represented the Staleys. Halas, whose
franchise later became the Chicago Bears, remained with the NFL more than 50 years as a
coach and administrator. See NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PROPERTIES, INC., THE NFL's
OFFIcIAL ENCYCLOPEDIC HISTORY OF PRo'ESSiONAL FOOTBALL 18-43 (1973) [hereinafter
NFL ENCYCLOPEDIA]. After mergers with rival leagues, and internal franchise shifts, today's
expanded NFL consists of 30 franchises, including; the Atlanta Falcons, Buffalo (N.Y.) Bills,
Chicago Bears, Carolina Panthers, Cincinnati Bengals, Cleveland Browns, Dallas Cowboys,
Denver Broncos, Detroit Lions, Green Bay (Wis.) Packers, Houston Oilers, Indianapolis
Colts, Jacksonville Jaguars, Kansas City Chiefs, Los Angeles Raiders, Los Angeles Rams,
Miami Dolphins, Minnesota Vikings, New England Patriots, New Orleans Saints, New York
Giants, New York Jets, Philadelphia Eagles, Phoenix Cardinals, Pittsburgh Steelers, San Di-
ego Chargers, San Francisco 49ers, Seattle Seahawks, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, and Washing-
ton Redskins. See infra notes 4-5 & 32-34.
3. The NFL made financial strides under Alvin Raymond "Pete" Rozelle, elected NFL
commissioner in 1960. Rozelle negotiated the first league-wide television contract covering
the 1962 and 1963 seasons with the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) for $4.65 million.
Revealing the emerging high value of televised pro football, CBS thereafter renewed in 1964
for a whopping $14.1 million. DAVID HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: INsIDE Tim NFL 13 (1987).
Today, the NFL has television contracts with the Fox Network (FOX), the National Broad-
casting Company (NBC), the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), and two nationwide
cable television services-the Entertainment & Sports Programming Network (ESPN) and
laner Network Television (TNT). Commentators have argued that by "tying up" most of the
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When the NFL opened for business, league franchises could be found
in smallish hamlets like Hammond, Indiana, and Decatur, Illinois. More
recent history has shown major cities such as Memphis, Tennessee, and
San Antonio, Texas, have bid unsuccessfully for league entry.4 Other
large municipalities, like Oakland, California, and Baltimore, Maryland,
have lost their highly-valued franchises to rival cities willing to make bet-
ter offers.5
country's nationwide television broadcasters and cable services, the NFL illegally monopolizes
professional football. "A league can effectively eliminate competition by contracting with
(multiple) networks." Philip A. Garubo, Jr., Note, The Last Legal Monopoly: The NFL and
its Television Contracts, 4 ETrr. & SPORTS L. Q. J. 357, 360 (1987).
4. Memphis, Tennessee, and Jacksonville, Florida, hosted franchises in two ill-fated rival
leagues that sought to compete with the NFL in recent years. In 1974, the Jacksonville Sharks
and Memphis Southmen became charter members of the short-lived World Football League
(WFL), which expired after two seasons. (The Southmen had actually began as the Toronto
"Northmen" before moving to Memphis prior to the start of the first WFL season). Then
beginning in 1983, the Jacksonville Bulls and the Memphis Showboats proved to be two of the
more stable franchises in the United States Football League (USFL), which lasted three sea-
sons. With respect to the established NFL, Jacksonville and Memphis have manifested two
fine examples of how an NFL owner, experiencing a lack of "cooperation" locally, tries to
coerce local politicians into helping his club by wooing cities without a league franchise. Un-
able to secure a new stadium in Baltimore, Colts' owner Robert Irsay visited Jacksonville and
Memphis in 1980. In Jacksonville, Irsay received promises of a renovated stadium, limo rides,
a police escort, and visits by lovely young women in T-shirts reading "I Got Colt Fever."
After a similar reception in Memphis, Irsay declared "We are moving out of Baltimore. At
this moment, it's either Memphis or Jacksonville." HARRus, supra note 3, at 365-66. Irsay
kept his Colts in Baltimore through the end of the 1983 season, before moving the team to
Indianapolis. See infra note 5 and accompanying text. Memphis remains without a franchise,
but the city of Jacksonville recently secured a team, as the league in 1994 voted to expand to
Jacksonville, as well as to Charlotte, N.C.
5. Attracted by the sudden, unexpected availability of the expansive Los Angeles Memo-
rial Coliseum - which was also to soon be renovated by local authorities in anticipation of
the 1984 Summer Olympic Games based in Los Angeles, Oakland Raider owner Al Davis
moved his team to Los Angeles in 1981. The suddenly-troubled Los Angeles Rams franchise,
which had occupied the Coliseum, had recently moved to Anaheim Stadium, south of Los
Angeles. The Baltimore Colts, on the other hand, were more directly lured away from Balti-
more by a government-funded "sweet deal" - to include rent-free access to a newly-con-
structed domed stadium, free access to a newly-constructed practice facility, and a substantial
low-interest loan - by authorities in Indianapolis, and so the Indianapolis Colts were born,
starting with the 1984 season. HAPRis, supra note 3, at 363-69. Unlike Oakland and Balti-
more, St. Louis represents a city which has been able to replace a previously-lost NFL
franchise. The NFL's St. Louis Cardinals vacated the midwest for Phoenix prior to the 1988
season. Originally the Phoenix Cardinals, the franchise re-named itself the Arizona Cardinals
in 1994. Private sector assets assumed most of the burden of luring the Cardinals from St.
Louis. The many inducements extended to St. Louis owner Bill Bidwill, from a consortium of
Phoenix businesses, included: (1) guaranteed attendance revenue; (2) guaranteed concessions
revenue; and (3) pay-offs to local Arizona State University (ASU), designed to offset ASU's
cost of constructing "luxury stadium boxes" in ASU's 70,000-seat "Sun Devil" stadium, which
was also to be made available to the Cardinals. See Hal Lancaster, St. Louis Cardinal's Deci-
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One can point to several factors that may be said to have contributed
to the ongoing, staggering popularity of the NFL. But no factor has
been more significant than the advent of national network-televised
NFL games.
During the past forty years, the nationwide broadcast networks and
the NFL have developed something of a symbiotic relationship. The
NFL has provided the networks "up-close" adventure, with real people
featured in a "which side are you on" conflict. The networks, in turn,
have provided the NFL with national exposure, and substantial revenues
from broadcast rights fees.6
Though the league and the networks have flourished together, the
NFL has been forced to regularly deflect legal challenges related to its
relationship with the television industry. One of the most regularly-chal-
lenged NFL policies has involved the league's historical propensity to
impose a television "blackout ' 7 within a league member's "home terri-
tory."' As pro football gained wide popularity, annoyed fans and local
media outlets began suing the NFL to have its blackout rule changed or
eliminated.9
sion to Move Highlights a Trend, W.LL ST. J., Jan 18, 1988, at 18. In early 1994 St. Louis, long
home to one of the most loyal league sponsors, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., was believed to be on
the verge of earning a replacement NFL franchise, as the NFL was said to be about to vote to
select St. Louis as an "expansion" franchise city. Surprisingly, however, private financing in
St. Louis fell through as the expansion vote approached. The Jacksonville (Fla.) Jaguars,
emerged to earn one of the two available league expansion franchises, along with the so-called
Carolina Panthers, based in Charlotte, N.C. In 1995, the still-troubled Los Angeles Rams
elected to attempt to relocate from Anaheim to St. Louis, which would finally land St. Louis
its much-awaited replacement team. The NFL moved to block this proposed relocation and as
of the date of this article no move has been undertaken.
6. The NFL negotiated its first collective television rights package in 1962 for two years at
$4.65 million dollars per year. By 1987, the league had signed television rights packages with
three national broadcast television networks (CBS, NBC & ABC), and two nationwide cable
television services (ESPN & TNT), totaling $1.438 billion. Garubo, supra note 3, at 371. The
NFL continued to contract with the five national networks until 1994, when one of the na-
tion's original and bulwark broadcast networks, CBS, found itself outbid by the emerging
FOX Network. Landing a contract for NFL coverage has been widely perceived to have been
a dramatic step toward FOX's gaining of credibility within the national broadcast television
industry as a bona fide "fourth network," that could vigorously compete with the traditional
"big three" broadcast networks (CBS, NBC & ABC).
7. In this context, the term "blackout" means to eliminate an otherwise televised event
from live television coverage within a specific geographic area.
8. The NFL defines a team's "home territory" as; "The city in which the club is located
and for which it holds a franchise and plays its home games, and includes the surrounding
territory to the extent of 75 miles in every direction from the exterior of the corporate limits of
such city." NFL CONsrnroN, art. IV, § 4.1 (1976)(emphasis added).
9. Blaich v. National Football League, 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. N.Y. 1962) (blackout in
New York of NFL championship game in New York upheld, even where no tickets remained
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In cases challenging NFL blackouts, courts have entertained issues
under the Federal Sherman Act of 1890,10 the Federal Copyright Revi-
sion Act of 1976,11 the Federal Communications Act of 1934,12 and even
the Constitution of the United States. 3
The league has historically asserted television blackouts are neces-
sary to protect local ticket sales. League administrators have argued the
NFL should not be required by the law to "give something away."' 4
Fans have countered, saying that the NFL has had it "both ways" to the
extent that the NFL has received nationally-generated income from tele-
vision, while at the same time the league has received locally-generated
income from ticket sales. Fans have also relied upon studies questioning
the validity of the assumption that local televising harms local ticket
sales.'5
Legal issues regarding NFL television blackouts date back to the
early days of television, and have persisted through the advent of cable
television and the home earth station or satellite dish. Although consti-
unsold); WTNWV v. National Football League, 678 F.2d 142 (11th Cir. 1982)(NFL's home
territory, for the purposes of television blackout, extended to include stations outside home
territory, with signal penetration into home territory); see also Colorado High Sch. Activities
Ass'n v. NFL, 711 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1983)(NFL held to have received insufficient notice to
comply with statutory exception to television blackout rule, designed to protect local ticket
sales to high school football game).
10. See infra note 19; Blaich, 212 F. Supp. 319 (blackout in New York of NFL champion-
ship game upheld, even where no tickets remained unsold, as within the statutory term home
game, for the purposes of immunization from Sherman Act of 1890); WTWV, 678 F.2d 142
(NFL's home territory, for the purposes of television blackout, extended to include stations
outside home territory, with signal penetration into home territory, held consistent with pur-
pose of immunization from Sherman Act of 1890).
11. See infra note 70; National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, 621 F. Supp 880,
(E.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 726 (1986) (use of Home Earth Station or satellite "dish" to
intercept blacked out NFL game by bar owner not covered by statutory exemption from the
Copyright Revision Act of 1976, allowing unauthorized retransmission with device "com-
monly used in private homes").
12. National Football League v. The Alley, 624 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Fla. 1983)(transmission of
locally blacked out game not under the Communications Act of 1934 proviso allowing unau-
thorized interception of material "transmitted... for the use of the general public").
13. Blaich, 212 F. Supp. at 319 (no deprivation of "property right," for the purposes of the
Constitution's 5th Amendment Due Process Clause).
14. Some commentators generally support the NFL on this position. See Gary R. Rob-
erts, Pirating Satellite Signals of Blacked-Out Sports Events: A Historical and Policy Perspec-
tive, 11 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & AxRs 363, 383-86 (1987).
15. In the mid-1970s, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) concluded that
anti-blackout legislation, enacted by Congress from 1973 to 1976, see infra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text, caused "no siginificant detrimental impact on any sport." Inquiry into
Professional Sports, 1976: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Professional Sports,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 53 (1976).
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tutional issues raised by NFL blackouts appear to be something of a
stretch,' 6 other claims regarding: (1) monopoly; (2) copyright; and (3)
broadcast statutes, are more plausible.
This paper outlines development of the law regarding NFL blackouts
in the three areas listed above, with some predictions for the future. The
paper also analyzes how courts have broadly interpreted federal statutes,
to the benefit of the NFL, throughout the technological changes charac-
terizing the telecommunications industry during the last forty years.
I. MONOPOLY
A. Monopoly Challenges to NFL Blackouts
In different contexts, the National Football League has been sued for
monopolizing professional football in the United States.' 7 However,
most plaintiffs raising federal anti-trust claims against the NFL under the
Sherman Act of 1890,18 have been unable to show a "causal link" be-
tween the NFL's monopoly status and injury, 19 or have been unable to
show definitive damages to earn a significant jury award.2°
16. The court evidenced little regard for the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim. The court
stated:
[P]laintiffs assert they are deprived of a valuable property right without due process of
law, contrary to the [5th] Amendment of the [flederal Constitution. (Plaintiffs assert a
right to) observe the telecast in common with the millions of Americans to whom it is
being televised .... While it is unnecessary for the purposes of this motion that the
Court consider and pass upon this somewhat nebulous constitutional issue... nonethe-
less it is of doubtful validity.
Blaich, 212 F. Supp. at 322 (emphasis added).
17. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)(established
"Rozelle Rule" named after longtime NFL commissioner Alvin Raymond "Pete" Rozelle,
held illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act of 1890). In dicta, the court flatly stated
the NFL "enjoys a monopoly over major league professional football in the United States."
Id at 610.
18. The Sherman Act of 1890 reads, in pertinent part, "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . .," 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
19. See Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 586
F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978)(jury found no causal link between proven league "group boycott,"
otherwise violating the Sherman Act of 1890, and damage to plaintiff).
20. See United States Football League v. National Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)(jury awarded only nominal damages to plaintiff in absence of willingness to
speculate as to actual damages, after plaintiff proved illegal monopoly, and harm caused to
plaintiff).
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1. Early Anti-Trust Challenge
In the early days of televised NFL games after World War II, the
league's twelve clubs separately sold broadcast rights to local television
stations at their discretion without much league interference. Fearful of
lost ticket revenue, most teams refrained from selling television rights to
home games. NFL rules also prevented teams from selling television
rights where a game could be viewed in the home territory of another
team.21
The practical impact of the league restraint resulted in a blackout of
all NFL games when the local team played at home. It was only when
the local team played away from home, that the game could be seen in
that city.22
In the early 1950s the NFL's policy seemed heavy-handed, as there
were few television stations and some of the league's twelve franchises'
home territories intersected. TWo teams occupied Chicago,2 while both
Washington and Baltimore2 4 had franchises.
NFL blackout rules began to impact league scheduling, which an-
noyed some franchises.25 Viewing choices became so limited that fans
often found themselves with no game to watch, even though several
games were being televised, simply because of league rules. After re-
ceiving complaints from fans and local television station operators, the
Federal Justice Department challenged the NFL's blackout rules in 1953
as violating the Sherman Act of 1890.26
A federal court in Philadelphia upheld the portion of the NFL's tele-
vision scheme regarding blackouts of home territories for the purposes
of home games-but struck the portion protecting home territories when
the home team played away from home.2
21. United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 322-27 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
22. Id
23. The Chicago Bears and Chicago Cardinals occupied the Chicago home territory for
more than 30 years, until the end of the 1950s. NFL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 2, at 301-03.
Cardinal owner Bill Bidwill moved the team to St. Louis in 1960, then to Phoenix in 1988. Id.
at 110; See also, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
24. The Baltimore Colts franchise eventually moved to Indianapolis in 1984. See supra
notes 4-5.
25. The Chicago Bears and Chicago Cardinals franchises found themselves particularly
affected by blackout rules. Naturally, the Chicago teams wished to avoid scheduling home
games opposite each other, so as to maximize ticket sales for each franchise in Chicago. But if
the Bears played away from Chicago, while the Cardinals played at home, neither team would
be seen on local television.
26. See supra note 23.
27. The court examined the NFL blackout rules by using the "Rule of Reason" analysis.
The court stated;
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The league declined to appeal the decision, leaving itself subject to a
court decree regarding any future league agreements with respect to
television. The NFL likely did not contest the decision because, in the
early 1950s, television revenue did not represent a substantial portion of
the league's income.28 At that time, the NFL had little at stake. But
soon, that changed.
2. The "Greatest" Game
On December 28, 1958, the NFL staged what has been called the
"greatest game ever played, 2z9 when the popular New York Giants
hosted the upstart Baltimore Colts for the league's championship con-
test. The Colts won the title, 23-17 in overtime, after the game had
ended in a 17-17 tie.3°
Despite the game's thrilling conclusion, players and coaches from
both clubs have often since stated that the game on the field was not
played particularly well. What has made the game great, in the view of
others, was the more than 50 million people who watched the game on
television.3
The first restriction imposed by [the NFL] is a reasonable one and a legal restraint of
trade.. .The reasonableness of [the other] restriction must also be tested by its effect on
gate receipts of a team's home games. It is obvious that on a day when the home team
is playing an away game there is no gate attendance to be harmed back in its home
area[.] . .Several of defendants' witnesses attempted to justify the restriction with the
opinion that it is necessary in this situation to protect the home team's 'good
will[.]'. .However .. this is nothing more than conjecture.
United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. at 326 (emphasis added).
Since the court applied a "Rule of Reason" analysis, it must have treated the NFL as a
group of multiple actors, for the purposes of anti-trust law. Some commentators believe
sports leagues to be "single entities," and, therefore, divorced from anti-trust liability. See
Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MiCH. L. REv. 1
(1983).
28. Roberts, supra note 14, at 370.
29. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
30. The game marked the first sudden death overtime game in NFL history, decided only
after the teams were forced to play an extra indefinite time period, beyond the standard-60
minutes. The game ended with the Colts winning after running back Alan "The Horse"
Ameche scored on a short plunge into the end zone. See NFL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 2,
at 110-11.
31. Even the league's own publications seem to concede the game to have been of aver-
age quality, but of high impact due to the large television audience.
This is the game that did it for the NFL. It has been called the greatest game ever
played. That can be argued, but one thing is certain: As John Unitas led the Colts in
their sudden-death drive to the winning touchdown, pro football was exploding into the
mind of America.
Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
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The 1958 NFL Championship Game's viewership statistics shocked
the offices of the NFL and the networks. All at once, the league began
regarding network television as the best way to expose pro football to
the masses. For the next three seasons, the league struggled with how to
best exploit national television, while at the same time protecting local
ticket sales.
3. A New League Brings a New Approach
The high television ratings from the 1958 NFL title game also quickly
got the attention of Texas millionaire oil mogul Lamar Hunt. An avid
sports enthusiast, Hunt wanted "in" on pro football. He proposed to
purchase the NFL's least successful franchise, the Chicago Cardinals, 2
and move the team to Dallas.
Perhaps because the NFL had sponsored an unsuccessful Dallas
franchise in 1952,11 the league refused Hunt's offer. Thereafter in 1959,
the jilted Hunt joined with other prospective pro football owners to form
the American Football League (AFL).34 The AFL began play in 1960
32. Roberts, supra note 14, at 371 n.13. The Cardinals began as a charter franchise of the
APFA in 1920. Until 1960, the Cardinals had never been forced to relocate, a feat unmatched
in the NFL to that point. Throughout the 1950s the Cardinals had performed poorly on the
field. That decade the Cardinals enjoyed only one winning season, finishing with the league's
worst record four times. NFL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 2, at 301-03. Attendance at Cardi-
nal games dipped to low levels. Former NFL place-kicker and receiver Pat Summerall, vet-
eran sports announcer with CBS, classified the 1950s Cardinals as "not the big leagues." After
declining Hunt's offer, the NFL moved the Cardinals to St. Louis for the 1960 season. Id at
110.
33. In 1952, the NFL experimented with the Dallas market. The league's New York
Yanks (previously Boston Yanks) franchise moved to Dallas after the 1951 season, becoming
the Dallas Texans. The experiment turned out to be a dramatic flop, however, as the Texans
lost 11 of 12 games and most of their already small band of followers. Before the regular
season ended, the NFL moved the floundering franchise to Hershey, Pennsylvania. The
league assumed player contracts for the rest of the season. In 1953, the Texans became the
Baltimore Colts. NFL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 2, at 302. The Colts, as it turned out, won
the NFL title in 1958. Id at 110.
34. Eight franchises formed the AFL. Hunt owned the "new" Dallas Texans (see supra
note 33, for discussion of the NFL version of the Dallas Texans), while other AFL clubs in-
cluded the Houston Oilers, Los Angeles Chargers, New York Titans, Denver Broncos, Buffalo
Bills, Boston Patriots and Minnesota Vikings. Before AFL play began in 1960, Viking owner-
ship accepted an offer for an NFL franchise, beginning in 1961. The AFL awarded its vacant
eighth franchise to the Oakland Raiders. The Vikings' shift resulted in an anti-trust suit by the
AFL against the NFL. See American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F.
Supp. 60,71-75 (D. Md. 1962)(franchise shift held not as a result of NFL attempt to monopo-
lize pro football). After six seasons successfully competing against the established NFL, the
AFL in 1966 agreed to "merge" with the NFL. Between AFL inception and merger comple-
tion in 1970, the Los Angeles Chargers had moved to San Diego, the Dallas Texans had
moved to Kansas City (renamed the Kansas City Chiefs), and the New York Titans had simply
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with eight league members playing before sparse crowds in worn, Great
Depression-era stadiums.
But despite consistently poor local ticket sales in its early years, the
AFL survived. In part, the rival league stayed afloat because of a novel
television rights contract it had arranged with the American Broadcast-
ing Company (ABC). The AFL pooled its broadcasting rights into a
package, then sold the package to ABC. The fledgling AFL then evenly
distributed the television revenue among the eight league members.35
The AFL's pooling concept caught the eye of newly-appointed NFL
commissioner Alvin R. "Pete" Rozelle. If the AFL could use television
revenue to cover for generally poor ticket sales, why couldn't the NFL
use such funds to compensate for low ticket sales by weak NFL
franchises, or even the more solid franchises that may be located in small
television markets?
B. The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961
After battling through internal squabbles,36 and an adverse federal
court ruling,37 Rozelle pushed the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961
been renamed the New York Jets. The AFL had also added the Miami Dolphins and Cincin-
nati Bengals franchises. Ultimately, the NFL found itself forced to assume the AFL's entire
roster of teams, a feat unmatched by any rival league in American professional sports history.
In 1950, the NFL had also merged with the rival All-American Football Conference (AAFC),
agreeing to assume three of 7 existing AAFC clubs in 1949; the Cleveland Browns, San Fran-
cisco 49ers, and the Baltimore Colts. Ironically, the Browns won the NFL's 1950 league cham-
pionship. The Colts franchise proved not to be as competitive, however, disbanding after the
1950 season. Pro football returned to Baltimore in 1953, as a second version of the Colts
surfaced after that NFL franchise had been based in Boston, New York and Dallas. See supra
note 33 and accompanying text. Included in the AFL-NFL merger terms, approved by Con-
gress, was an agreement to play a championship game after their respective seasons ended.
The first inter-league championship game after the 1966 season (later dubbed the "Super
Bowl") featured the NFL's Green Bay Packers and the AFL's Kansas City Chiefs in a game
won by the Packers, 35-10, at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum. NFL ENCYcroPEDIA,
supra note 2, at 126-27.
35. Roberts, supra note 14, at 371.
36. Some NFL owners, like the Washington Redskins' George Preston Marshall, objected
to the revenue-sharing plan. Through the 1950s, Marshall considered the whole southeast of
the United States as Redskins' home territory, and he did not endear himself easily to the
notion that NFL franchises from smaller markets would receive the same portion of network
television revenue as the Redskins. HARRIS, supra note 3, at 15.
37. The NFL had more to worry about with respect to pooling agreements than the AFL.
NFL television policies found themselves remaining under the scrutiny of a 1953 decree result-
ing from United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. at 319. Therefore, the NFL
returned to the same federal courthouse to test the agreement. The court found the agree-
ment violative of the terms of its prior decree. According to the court, the league's agreement
placed too much discretion regarding where games were to be televised with the network.
The court stated the league's agreement "restrict[ed] the individual clubs from determining
1995]
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through Congress.3 8 The Act allowed professional sports leagues to pool
television rights, then sell them to a network in a fashion exactly as de-
vised by the AFL.39
The Act immunized the NFL from the above-mentioned adverse rul-
ing, delivered from the same court that had reviewed NFL blackout rules
in 1953.40 Since the NFL remained subject to that court's decree, the
court had properly reviewed the NFL plan, and struck it down as violat-
ing the anti-trust laws. But when Congress passed the Sports Broadcast-
ing Act, federal lawmakers effectively "overruled" the federal court.
1. Blackout Provision
The Act also contained an important provision regarding television
blackouts. Under the provision, Congress adopted part of the federal
court's 1953 ruling regarding the NFL. The Act banned protection of
home territories from other sports league teams when a team played
away from home, but allowed blackouts for the benefit of a team playing
at home in the name of protecting ticket sales to the game.41
It is important to note that under the Act, blackouts included any
type of sports league-imposed blackout. So if the NFL wished to black-
the areas within which.. .telecasts of games... may be made," as barred under the decree.
United States v. National Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1961). After the
decision, the NFL and AFL for once agreed on something. With pooling agreements in both
leagues in jeopardy, the rival leagues spent the next several weeks lobbying Congress for what
would, in only 72 days, become the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961. See infra notes 38-39.
38. Pub. L. No. 87-331,75 Stat. 732 (1961)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295
(1988)).
39. The Sports Brocasting Act of 1961 allowed sports leagues to package broadcast rights,
sell the package, then pool the resulting revenue among the member franchises. The law
states;
The anti-trust laws.. .shall not apply to anyjoint agreement by or among persons engag-
ing in or conducting the organized professional team sports of football, baseball, bas-
ketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs participating in professional football,
baseball, basketball or hockey contests, sells, or otherwise transfers all or any part of
the rights of such league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of
football, baseball, basketball or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or conducted by
such clubs.
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988)(emphasis added).
40. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
41. The Act mirrored the 1953 federal court ruling that stated, in pertinent part;
[The Sports Broadcasting Act] shall not apply to any joint agreement... which prohibits
any person to whom rights are sold or transferred from televising any games within any
area, except within the home territory of a member club of the league on a day when
such club is playing a game at home.
15 U.S.C. § 1292 (1988)(emphasis added).
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out all other league games from an area, to protect the local entry playing
at home that day, it could legally do so.
2. AFL Competition
In the early years of the Sports Broadcasting Act a growing incentive
emerged for the NFL not to blackout games. Increasingly, the NFL did
not mind beaming out-of-town league games into home territories, even
on days when the local team played at home. Competition from the rival
AFL provides insight as to why.
The NFL found itself in an exposure battle with the emerging AFL at
the time, and the NFL apparently became willing to sacrifice local ticket
sales to match AFL television exposure.
AFL policy allowed for out-of-town league games to be viewed in
any given AFL city, even while a local AFL team played at home. The
AFL reasoned that by so doing, overall positive exposure for the AFL
would increase. Soon the NFL matched the AFL's strategy, despite stat-
utory authority for the NFL to blackout at will.
In the end, the NFL and AFL competed for six years, with the
leagues announcing a merger in 1966.42
3. Local Ticket Sales or National Exposure?
Since the AFL-NFL merger was consummated in 1970, the expanded
NFL has returned to a policy limiting television interference with the
local team playing at home. If a league member plays at home, no other
game can be shown locally during that time period.43
The NFL's flip-flopping with this policy raises the reasonable ques-
tion: What is more important to the NFL, local ticket sales or nation-
wide television exposure?
The NFL's current monopoly status seems to provide clues as to the
answer. During a period of competition with a rival league the NFL
opted for nationwide television exposure, therefore, one can reasonably
conclude that for all its talk about protecting local ticket sales the NFL is
really more interested in protecting television markets. Once the
leagues merged, and the then-enlarged NFL returned to monopoly sta-
42. See supra note 34.
43. Today, both FOX and NBC televise several NFL games each Sunday during two time
periods: (1) 1 to 4 p.m. (early); and (2) 4 to 7 p.m. ET (late). If the NFL's Atlanta Falcons, for
instance, play a game at home during the early period, and that game is not sold out, neither
network can show any other league game during that period in the Atlanta home territory.
1995]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
tus, protection of local ticket sales seemed to take on renewed
importance.
C. Court Interpretation of the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961
The first court to review league policy under the Sports Broadcasting
Act of 1961 expanded its language for the benefit of the NFL. The court
in Blaich v. National Football League, held that the NFL could legally
blackout the otherwise sold out 1962 league championship game be-
tween the Green Bay Packers and the host New York Giants.'
The court held the Act's language could be easily read so that the
statutory term "game at home" included a league championship game
played at home." According to the court, it would be foolish to judi-
cially amend the Act by interpreting the term to also mean "except for a
championship game."'
Although its statutory interpretation seemed sound enough, the
Blaich court seemed to gloss over the key fact that the game had been
sold out well ahead of time. Since the purpose of the statute had pur-
portedly been to protect local ticket sales, a sold out contest would ap-
pear to obviate the need for statutory protection. In the case of a
sellout, it would appear that there would be no local ticket sales left to
protect.
The Blaich court relied on a dubious historical examination of the
less-than-capacity crowds for NFL championship games, and concluded
"[t]he fact that this year's game is a sellout does not overcome the
demonstrated experience of recent years."'47 The rationale is questiona-
ble because the examined years were before enactment of the Sports
Broadcasting Act of 1961, which officially established the NFL's ration-
ale as local ticket sale protection.
Although the NFL blackout prevailed in Blaich, arguably the seed
had been planted for future change. How long could the NFL continue
to blackout sold out home games, with the clear purpose of the immuniz-
ing Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961-the protection of local ticket
sales?
44. Blaich, 212 F. Supp. at 319.
45. Id. at 322.
46. Id.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
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1. Congress Softens Blackout Policy
About ten years after Blaich, the NFL's historically poor Washington
Redskins started winning games,48 and attracting new fans, including
some who had been elected to Congress. When Congressional repre-
sentatives experienced difficulty obtaining tickets49 to sold out Redskin
home play-off games50 against the Green Bay Packers and Dallas Cow-
boys, the inevitable happened.
Before the next season started, Congress had amended the Commu-
nications Act of 1934,51 requiring the NFL to lift any local blackout of a
home game if the game is sold out52 at least seventy-two hours in ad-
vance of the scheduled starting time.53
The NFL complained that local ticket sales would be lost because
large numbers of local fans, who might otherwise have bought tickets in
advance of the deadline, would delay a buying decision until the last
moment-in anticipation of a ruling as to whether the game will be lo-
cally-televised. With that dubious argument,54 however, the league con-
vinced Congress to write the law so as to allow it to expire on December
31, 1975.55
48. In 1972, the Redskins enjoyed their best season on the field since 1945. NFL ENCY.
CLOPEDiA, supra note 2, at 301-08. The Redskins finished with 11 wins and only three defeats
on their way to a league championship berth against the Miami Dolphins. Miami won Super
Bowl VII by a score of 14-7. Id at 156-59.
49. Roberts, supra note 14, at 379-81.
50. At the time of the decision in Blaich the NFL sponsored only one post-season game.
It was a title game featuring two conference champions. The AFL used the same system. The
leagues soon employed play-off systems, with more teams in post-season. By the late 1960s, a
play-off team needed two play-off victories simply to reach the championship contest.
51. 47 U.S.C. § 101 (1975).
52. According to the amendment, a game was "sold out" at the point when tickets "avail-
able for purchase by the general public one hundred and twenty hours or more before the
scheduled beginning time of such game have been purchased seventy-two hours or more"
before the scheduled starting time of the game. Id (emphasis added).
53. Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to read, in pertinent part:
If any game of a professional sports club is to be.. .(televised)... and all tickets of
admission for seats at such game which were available for purchase by the general
public one hundred and twenty hours or more before the scheduled beginning time of
such game have been purchased seventy-two hours or more before (the start of the
game), no agreement which would prevent the.. .(telecasting)... of such game... shall
be valid.
The Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 331 (1975), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-107,87 Stat. 350
(1973)(repealed under its Qwn terms December 31, 1975)(emphasis added).
54. As suggested by the court in National Football League (116 F. Supp. at 322-27) any
speculation as to the ticket buying habits of football fans should not be taken seriously by the
courts or lawmakers as it is "nothing more than conjecture." Id. at 326.
55. 47 U.S.C. § 331 (1975).
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2. Instant Replay-Local Ticket Sales or National Exposure?
Since the statute expired, the NFL has voluntarily adhered to its
terms with one exception.56 Interestingly, under current NFL rules,
where a franchise sells all its tickets in time to allow for a local telecast,
no other NFL game can be shown on the telecasting network's local affil-
iate that day. This is the case even where a game had been previously
scheduled to be televised, and starting times for games do not conflict.
For example, imagine that the NFL's Atlanta Falcons play at home,
starting at 1:00 p.m., Eastern time. The game would be blacked out on
the Atlanta FOX-affiliated station. A later game would routinely be
scheduled by FOX and the NFL for Atlanta, likely featuring a San Fran-
cisco 49ers or Arizona Cardinals home contest from the West.
When the Falcons' game sells out, the NFL lifts the local blackout on
the early Falcons game. Strangely enough, however, the NFL goes one
step further and also eliminates the later game from Atlanta FOX cover-
age. An old movie is dusted off and appears on the screen. The NFL's
television "penalty" imposed upon localities for high ticket sales seems
to undermine the purpose the NFL put forth in support of the Sports
Broadcasting Act of 1961-to protect such sales. If the NFL believes
local ticket sales are important enough to warrant statutory protection,
why would the league effectively penalize local viewers in NFL cities by
reducing league television coverage, after other locals have filled the
stadium?
Arugably, the answer can be found by examining who regularly
purchases remaining tickets to sold out NFL games. Often a local net-
work affiliate, which otherwise regularly televises the games of a given
NFL franchise when the team is away from home, purchases the remain-
ing tickets to that team's home contests in the interest of local good-
will.57 The NFL is, of course, powerless to stop the purchase and allows
the local blackout to be lifted. Not wishing to give one network an edge
in NFL exposure, simply because some local network affiliate is willing
to buy remaining tickets, the league chooses to remove any further tele-
vised games from that network affiliate that day.
Still, the NFL's policy glibly assumes network affiliates-not fans-
always buy remaining tickets.
56. Roberts, supra note 14, at 380-81.
57. For instance, let's say an Atlanta Falcons home game against the Los Angeles Rams
nearly sold out before the deadline. Predictably, public pressure locally would be applied to
Atlanta's CBS affiliate, which otherwise carries most Falcon away contests, to purchase the
remaining tickets before the deadline, and lift the blackout.
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3. Signal Penetration into Home Territories
A federal court in Florida, in like manner of the Blaich court, more
recently loosely interpreted the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 for the
benefit of NFL blackout rules.58
Since passage of the Act, the NFL has interpreted the statute's sec-
tion regarding television blackouts of home territories to include televi-
sion stations with studios and transmitters outside the seventy-five-mile
limit, but with signal penetration inside the protected zone.5 9 According
to the league, the NFL could blackout home games from telecast on such
stations.
The studios and transmitter of television station WTWV in south
Florida were located beyond the seventy-five-mile barrier defining the
Miami Dolphins' home territory, but the station signal easily penetrated
the blackout zone so WTWV tested the NFL's interpreration of the Act
in court.6 °
The court held for the NFL based upon the view that the purpose of
the Act-to protect local ticket sales-would be undermined if the
plaintiff were allowed to beam Dolphin home games inside the seventy-
five-mile NFL radius.6'
The legislative history surrounding the language of the Sports Broad-
casting Act of 1961 is inconclusive.62 But clearly, Congress seemed to
codify part of the 1953 case United States v. National Football League as
part of the Act.63 Testimony in that case by then NFL commissioner
Bert Bell defined a league's home territory as not inclusive of television
stations and transmitters located beyond the seventy-five-mile circle.64
58. WTWV, 678 F.2d 142.
59. Robert L. Waldman, Antitrust Law - Signal Penetration or Station Location: the
Scope of the National Football League's Television Blackout Antitrust Exemption, 6 W. NEw
ENG. L. REv. 877, 886-89 (1984).
60. WTWV, 678 F.2d at 142.
61. Id. at 146.
62. Waldman, supra note 59, at 886.
63. Id. at 883-886.
64. In testimony at trial, Bell testified that a home territory did not impact signals from
television stations with transmitters located outside the home territory, but with signal pene-
tration into the home territory.
Court questioning of Bell provides insight, and is provided below in pertinent part:
Q. This rule may not be so clear in some points. Take this situation: A
new.. .television station has just been opened, a very powerful one, just outside the
75-mile limit. The studio is in Reading, within the 75-mile limit, but the transmitter
is just outside the 75-mile limit. How do you take a situation of that kind under
your rule?
A. Well if the station was within the 75-mile limit -
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The impact of a signal penetration definition for the NFL's federally
endorsed home territory is to greatly enlarge the territory for the pur-
poses of television blackouts. Because a station's signal may be seen
within the seventy-five-mile zone, viewers residing outside the zone are
effectively pulled into the zone for the purposes of the blackout.
4. Interpreting the Sports Broacasting Act-Language or Purpose?
In Blaich, the court strictly interpreted the language of the Sports
Broadcasting Act of 1961, giving little weight to a key fact striking at the
purpose of the Act. However, in WTWV, the court relied upon the pur-
pose of the Act as the basis of its decision. It appears the only judicial
consistency evidenced between Blaich and WTWVis that the court ruled
for the NFL both times.
5. Dish Owners Emerge: Old Statutes v. New Technology
Courts backed the NFL's right to blackout telecasts throughout the
emergence of nationally-televised professional football. Bouncing
games across the continent required use of specialized equipment to
send and receive signals, to include home earth stations or satellite
dishes. For years, professional broadcasters monopolized this sort of his-
torically expensive hardware. Consumers simply could not afford to out-
fit themselves with satellite dishes and other such high-tech
communications equipment.
In recent years, of course, that has changed. The satellite dish has
become increasingly available and affordable to consumers and small
businesses alike. With respect to NFL blackouts, the result of the advent
of the satellite dish has been predictable, and is generally described in
Part "Wo and Part Three of this article. Satellite dish owners have by-
Q. Understand, the studio is but the transmitter is not and it is so powerful that.. .it is
going to beam right down in Philadelphia.
A. If it is outside the 75-mile limit -
Q. What, the studio, or the transmitter?
A. Where it is sent from.
Q. The transmitter.
A. Where it is sent from, yes. If it is sent from the transmitter and that is outside the
75-mile limit. That happens, Your Honor, to us, to our New York stations and
different stations outside the 75-mile limit... Now in my opinion what we have to do
is learn to live with this situation.
Id, at 882-83, quoting Record at 1813-1814, United States v. National Football League, 116 F.
Supp. 319.
Some commentators argue the court failed to give enough consideration to Bell's testi-
mony, as Congressional intent relating to the Act seemed to include codifying the decision.
Waldman, supra note 59, at 882-83.
[Vol. 5:221
NFL NETWORK BLACKOUTS
passed NFL blackouts with the new competing technology. The league
quickly sought courtroom protection for broadcasts from unauthorized
reception. Since courts have been forced to apply dated legislation to
consumer use of modem equipment, the results have not been without
strained reasoning.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW: NFL 1, DISH OWNERS 0
To date, there has been one challenge by a home earth station owner
to the NFL television blackout policy under the Federal Copyright Re-
vision Act of 1976.65
In St. Louis, several bar owners imported the "dirty feed"'66 of
blacked-out St. Louis Cardinals home games with a satellite dish they
had purchased and placed atop their buildings. The bar owners freely
admitted pirating the plaintiff NFL's dirty feed, but the bar owners
claimed protection from the NFL's reliance upon the Act under an ex-
emption in the Act. The exemption allowed retransmitting otherwise
copyrighted material with "apparatus of a kind commonly used in pri-
vate homes."67
Enacted before satellite dishes were generally available to consum-
ers, Congress passed the exemption to protect small businesses from lia-
bility for using audiovisual equipment to retransmit otherwise
copyrighted material.68
Two lower federal courts and the Eighth Circuit held against the bar
owners as they were not yet prepared to conclude that satellite dishes
amounted to audiovisual equipment "commonly used in private homes"
for the purposes of the statute.69
Interestingly, however, the circuit court left itself open to the propo-
sition that some day satellite dishes would be commonplace in private
homes, and thereby might fall within the Act's exemption.70 In so doing,
65. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
66. Signals sent from event to network headquarters. The "clean feed" contains no com-
mercial advertising. Advertisements are added by the network at its headquarters to create
the "dirty feed," which is then transmitted back to the broadcast area. Roberts, supra note 14,
at 365-66.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1988).
68. Francis M. Nevins, Antenna Dilemma: The Exemption from Copyright Liability for
Public Performance Using Technology Common in the Home, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
403, 406-07 (1987).
69. National Football League v. Cousin Hugo's, 600 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Mo. 1984); McBee
& Bruno's, 621 F. Supp. 880 affd, 792 F.2d 726.
70. McBee & Bruno's, 621 F. Supp. at 885.
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the circuit court in National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's71 prop-
erly sent out a warning signal to the NFL and Congress that an amend-
ment to the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 may be in order if satellite
dish use by consumers expands.
III. COMMUNICATIONS LAW: NFL 2, DIsH OWNERS 0
To date, there has been one challenge to the NFL blackout rules by a
home earth station under the Federal Communications Act of 1934.72
Like the bar owners in McBee & Bruno's, the owners of The Alley,
Inc., in Miami, freely admitted pirating otherwise locally-blacked-out
NFL games featuring the Miami Dolphins. Unlike the St. Louis bar
owners, the defendants in National Football League v. The Alley,73
claimed protection under the Communications Act of 1934, not the Fed-
eral Copyright Revision Act of 1976. 74
The principal legislation regulating broadcasting in the United States,
the Communications Act, prohibits unauthorized interception of "com-
munication by wire or radio."75 However, the same section of the Act
contains a proviso, allowing unauthorized interception where the com-
munication is transmitted "for the use of the general public. 76
In its defense, The Alley, Inc. argued that the NFL's "dirty feed"77
had been broadcast "for the use of the general public," and so was cov-
ered by the proviso. In a brief opinion, without much discussion, the
court in The Alley declared that the NFL's satellite communications
were not intended for public use.78
There can be little doubt that the court correctly found that the
NFL's satellite feed was not intended for public use, at least insofar as
the otherwise blacked-out Miami area is concerned. As discussed in Part
One above, the Sports Broadcasting Act of 196179 allows local blackouts.
As such, the court's holding is well-grounded. Still, the court's rationale
appears to be wanting. According to the court, "[T]he necessity of spe-
71. Id.
72. 47 U.S.C. § 101.
73. The Alley, 624 F. Supp. 6.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
75. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1975).
76. Id.
77. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
78. The Alley, 624 F.Supp. at 7. The Federal Communications Commission later con-
cluded that network feeds could not be legally pirated under § 605(a). See Inquiry into the
Scrambling of Satellite Television Signals and Access to those Signals by Owners of Home Satel-
lite Dish Antennas, 2 F.C.C.R. (Vol. 6) 1669, 1695 (1987).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1292 (1988).
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cial and expensive receiving equipment not in common household use
demonstrates that the satellite transmissions cannot have been intended
for use by the general public." °
According to the court, because satellite dishes were expensive at the
time of its ruling, the NFL could not have intended to use them to trans-
mit information for public use. By this rationale, the court seems to
have tied the NFL's communicative intent to the cost and availability of
a product. This rationale is strained, especially when one considers that
satellite dish prices have declined in recent years, making them more
available to consumers. As stated by the court in McBee & Bruno's,
satellite dishes may some day be much more commonplace.'3
In its own way, therefore, the court in The Alley has left an opening
under the Communcations Act of 1934 similar to the opening left by
McBee & Bruno's under the Copyright Act of 1976. If and when satel-
lite dish use becomes less expensive, the NFL's intent to communicate
for the use of the general public will change accordingly. As such, unau-
thorized interception under the Communications Act of 1934's proviso
may well be permissible.
IV. PUBLIC REACTION TO NFL BLACKOUTS
Perhaps because of the local notoriety of National Football League v.
The Alley,82 a group of Miami bar owners organized the now-defunct
United Sports Fans of America (USFA). 3 A central stated purpose of
the USFA was to oppose what it believed to be oppressive NFL televi-
sion policies, including blackouts.'
A. Signal Scrambling - "Blacking Out" the Satellite Dish
Just prior to the 1990 NFL season, the league announced it would
code the broadcast signal, or "scramble" 85 all NFL games-except for
the NFL's weekly "Monday Night Football" game carried on ABC, and
80. The Alley, 624 F. Supp. at 10 (emphasis added).
81. McBee & Bruno's, 621 F. Supp. at 882.
82. The Alley, 624 F. Supp. at 6.
83. The USFA described itself as "a powerful voice for the American sports fan." See
Mark Robinchaux, How The Sports Bar Huddled and Bent on NFL Blitz, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,
1990, at BI.
84. Id.
85. Technically, the commonly-used slang verb "scramble" means to encrypt with a spe-
cial code, making a signal impossible to fully reproduce without the assistance of special re-
ceiving equipment. For a statutory definition of the term "encrypt," see Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(3)(1988).
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those few Sunday games otherwise designated by the league to be
viewed in a given region or home territory. Such widespread scrambling
of course frustrated football fans who owned satellite dishes, and could
otherwise receive NFL games from around the country each week. For
example, assume that an avid follower of the San Francisco 49ers lives in
Miami and owns a satellite dish. Under the scrambling scheme, that fan
would have been physically blocked by the league from viewing most, if
not all, 49ers games.
The USFA viewed the NFL's scrambling policy as oppressive, 6 and
pressured Congress to consider amending the Communications Act of
193487 with legislation limiting the NFL plan. The bill, known as the
Access to Professional Sports Programming Act of 1990,88 was fashioned
and considered in committee, but never enacted.
Still, the USFA successfully pursuaded key league sponsors, such as
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., to lobby the NFL against enacting the plan.89
USFA commissioner Marc Forlenza, a Miami-area bar owner, traveled
the country, urging fellow tavern operators to boycott Anheuser-Busch
products during the 1990 NFL season. Soon, Anheuser-Busch con-
cluded it could not afford the lost potential revenue and adverse public-
ity, so the famous beer-maker sided with the USFA.90 According to an
Anheuser-Busch spokesman, corporate executives advised NFL officials
"we are very sympathetic with the plight of these people."91 Since
Anheuser-Busch had just signed a four-year, $90 million contract with
ABC to advertise on Monday Night Football, the league naturally took
notice. Soon after, USFA officials met with the then relevant network
executives representing the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) and
the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), the NFL revoked its scram-
bling plan.92
86. USFA literature described the NFL plan as follows: "Do you want the choice of
watching your favorite football games either at home or at your local sports bar, via satellite
dish? THE NFL SAYS NO! You have no choices. You'll watch the game we want you to
watch, if at all." See UNrrED SponRs F~as oF AmERICA, M mnEnssm' APPLICATION (1990).
87. 47 U.S.C. § 101.
88. Id. at § 605, as amended by H.R. 5709, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
89. Robinchaux, supra note 83, at B1.
90. Id,
91. Id.
92. Id.
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B. Unscrambling Some Revenue
Perhaps in reaction to the public debate regarding widespread scram-
bling of league telecasts, the NFL in 1994 cleverly devised a creative
solution to address the concerns of satellite dish owners while adding
revenue. Before the 1994 season, the NFL once again announced it
would scramble Sunday pro football, except for those games designated
for local broadcast, and the Monday Night Football game. The league
also announced that a large "unscrambled" package of pro football tele-
casts, dubbed the "NFL Sunday Ticket" by the league, would be made
available to satellite dish owners.
In fact, the NFL Sunday Ticket package offers dish owners author-
ized access to no less than each and every Sunday broadcast network
telecast, each week of the season. Dish owners need only pay an argua-
bly modest authorization fee to the league in order to receive NFL Sun-
day Ticket.93 In addition, the dish owner, with NFL authority, can access
NFL telecasts from around the country all day Sunday. This is an advan-
tage the dish owner has over the conventional television viewer, who
may be equipped with merely a conventional antenna, or the option to
subscribe to cable television.
That is the good news.
The bad news? Even with respect to NFL Sunday Ticket, local tele-
casts of a home team playing at home remain blacked out to the satellite
dish owner, via a scrambled signal unless the home game is sold out.94
CONCLUSION
The NFL and television have flourished together during the past
forty years. Despite challenges under federal law, the NFL has generally
been allowed to protect local ticket revenue with television blackouts,
93. The NFL's suggested retail price for its fee is about $130.00.
94. Satellite dish owners may also find themselves more directly scrambled by one of the
two broadcast television networks currently under contract with the NFL - that being FOX.
For instance, though all 1994 regular season games, otherwise telecast by FOX around the
country, were made available to dish owners via the "NFL Sunday Ticket" plan, post-season
league play-off games, to be telecast via FOX, were available to dish owners only via a sepa-
rate subscription. Dish owners otherwise generally accessing FOX programming, via the sev-
eral FOX network stations otherwise captured by a dish, found FOX programming generally
available to them - with the exception, of course, being televised NFL football. Of course,
subscribers to NFL Sunday Ticket enjoyed a built-in way to avoid any specific need to sepa-
rately subscribe to FOX to view televised pro football during the regular season. However,
the NFL Sunday Ticket plan only applied to the regular season, so dish owners who wished to
view FOX-telecasted play-off games were forced to separately subscribe, with the designated
dish-subscriber station normally being KDVR, a FOX affiliate in Denver.
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while also commanding large rights fees from national television
networks.
NFL policies created soon after passage of the Sports Broadcasting
Act of 1961, however, seem to indicate that national television exposure
is more important to the league than local ticket sales.
During the several years it competed with a rival league, the NFL
chose not to take advantage of its statutory authority, so as to better
compete for valuable television exposure. Since its merger with the
AFL, the NFL has taken full advantage of its authority, and even en-
acted blackout policies that punish localities for high ticket sales.
Since the advent of consumer and small business use of satellite
dishes, the NFL has sucessfully sued to stop pirating under both the
Copyright Act of 1976 and the Communications Act of 1934. With re-
spect to dish use, however, both acts are dated and do not provide the
league complete protection if dishes become more commonplace con-
sumer items. As a result, the NFL may conclude that it must lobby Con-
gress for updated legislation. The better view is that Congress should
not commit to updating the acts to regulate satellite dish use.
But, the emergence of new communications technology, like the sat-
ellite dish, should not be stunted by heavy-handed government involve-
ment. Instead, the NFL would appear to be in the best position to
alleviate pirating by working with the networks to encrypt, or "scram-
ble," its broadcasts to prevent unauthorized reception. Along these
lines, the NFL Sunday Ticket plan may be viewed as a very positive step,
because it allows dish owners to lawfully take fuller advantage of a new
technology.
Subscribers to NFL Sunday Ticket should thank members of the
United Sports Fans of America (USFA) who were sympathetic charac-
ters-fans and small businessmen out to please customers. USFA mem-
bers led the league out of the darkness, and showed that dish-owning
fans and business operators might indeed be willing to pay the NFL to
become authorized recipients of NFL broadcasts.
The satellite dish will only become more commonplace in the years
ahead. The NFL would do well to adjust accordingly, and work with
dish users to form other such equitable arrangements-rather than in-
sisting upon protectionist legislation.
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